At the end of his column today the NY Times' Murray Chass posed the (probably) rhetorical question about whether the Twins don't have the money to extend Johan Santana. They do have the money, of course, and it's very perplexing to those of us following the team. So I decided to give the question my normal thirty second thought to determine if I could convince myself of what has happened, is happening, and will happen.
We in Minnesota understand the general Twins philosophies that (a) the Twins don't sign a pitcher for more than four years and (b) the Twins don't pay a player 25% of their payroll. What those of us never understood about Terry Ryan is why he couldn't see the trap he'd put himself into by not fully appreciating the reasons for locking up your star players, namely that inflation is always going to be ugly and when a star smells free agency, the chance to sign him reasonably is all but done.
The easy example would appear to be Torii Hunter, and to some extent that's true. However, when the Twins signed Hunter after the 2002 season, I was cautious about the money relative to Hunter's ability and actually thought there would be another CF in place after 2006. The Twins, after all, had drafted Denard Span in June, 2002 and all outlets labeled him the heir apparent to Hunter. The Twins were smart enough to include a club option for 2007, just in case Span wasn't quite ready yet. Little did we know that Span wouldn't Pan (out), and that the Twins would probably had been smart to try to get multiple club options in Hunter's contract.
But let's go back to the fall of 2006, the time at which it became clear to the Twins that Span wasn't close to ready and would very possibly never be a starting CF. The Twins exercised their club option on Hunter for 2007 and had the ability to sign him to what can now be called a reasonable extension, in light of Hunter's five year, $90 million contract with the Angels. The Twins in all likelihood could have signed Hunter for four years and $60 million or even slightly less.
The problem, though, and I hope the Twins saw this and weren't just being their cheap selves, was that Hunter was going to be 33 midway through his first season of his contract, five years older than the hitter's prime age of 27-28. Throw in the constant lack of plate discipline and declining fielding skills, and at the very most Hunter's worth to the Twins was somewhat close to $15 million a year for only 2008 and 2009. In other words, this was not about locking up young talent.
No, where I wanted the Twins to lock up young talent was when their best hitter was an overweight 1B/DH. The Twins, in all their wisdom, non-tendered David Ortiz instead. I wish I had blogged back then to prove it to the doubters, but instead you'll have to go to the archives of the Twins Dickie Thon forum and look for someone with "stat" in the name who hated Ryan, Ron Gardenhire, Jacque Jones, and wasn't totally sold on Hunter. Under whatever Statman or Statguy nickname I had, there is an embarrassing amount of screaming and crying about the possibility of Ortiz being released.
Today it seems obvious that a Twins team looking to lock up its young talent would be signing Justin Morneau, not Michael Cuddyer (age/prime again), and looking closely at Francisco Liriano, Scott Baker, Delmon Young, and even Joe Mauer, whose contract will be ending in three years. Hey, Bill Smith, you've got to be looking at it now, not later.
Where the Twins got themselves in trouble with Santana is waiting far too long. After the 2006 season, Santana had shown himself to be the best pitcher in baseball each of the past three years. He had two years left on his contract, and he would be barely 30 by the time his new contract started in 2009. Age 30 for a pitcher is like age 27 for a hitter, so in essence the Twins in dealing with Santana would be locking up a player six years younger than Hunter.
The Twins ended up offering Hunter a three year contract and were willing to pay $15 million a year for ages 33, 34, and 35. Are they not willing to pay a much, much better player--perhaps the best player in baseball--$20 million dollars a year for comparative (think pitchers relative to hitters) age 27 through 33 seasons? Then consider that the value of the $20 million would be affected greatly, baseball inflation-wise, by the fact that the Hunter contract would have run from 2008-2010, while the Santana contract might run from 2009-2015. Add in there that the Twins would be generating new revenue starting with the 2010 season, that Santana has past the injury nexus that most pitchers deal with, and that $20 million would be a much smaller portion of the payroll in 2015 than it would be in 2009, and you see why it's perplexing that the Twins don't make an honest effort to sign Santana long-term.
The very fact that Carlos Silva just got paid $50 million for four years should tell you that the Twins could go at least 7 and 140 for Santana. I mean, what will $20 million mean in 2015? Will it be enough money for some team like the Rangers to sign Boof Bonser? Meanwhile, the Twins likely would be paying a highly possible Hall of Fame pitcher for the last year of his (pitching) prime.
It makes you wonder. Do the Twins see something, or are they afraid of a dropoff in Santana's effectiveness? It's a lot easier to tell yourself a guy's tipping pitches, losing bite, not throwing the slider, or might get injured when you're asked to pony up $140 million.
Oh, and that number is the minimum, folks.
Showing posts with label Denard Span. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Denard Span. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Another look at the Castillo trade
The Twins traded pending free agent Luis Castillo to the Mets in late July for uninspiring OF prospect Dustin Martin and organization-filling C Drew Butera. At the time the trade drew criticism from both the clubhouse and from Twins fans hoping to exchange the 2Bman for a true prospect.
Martin was a 23 yr old batting 287/358/421 for the Mets High A farm team, while Butera (who turned 24 days after the deal) after a recent promotion was batting 188/208/231 in 117 AA at-bats. Both players were old for High A in 2007, and neither was consider a top Mets prospect.
The alternative, of course, was to keep Castillo with the hope he could lead the Twins to the playoffs and garner the team both a first round and a supplemental pick as a Type A free agent. But the Twins correctly assessed that Castillo would not be enough to help the Twins reach the playoffs, and they further determined that the loss of Castillo would only yield the one supplemental pick that comes with being a Type B free agent.
So what was the trade worth to the Twins compared to what they would have received in compensation?
First of all, it should be noted that Terry Ryan saved nearly $2 MM by dealing Castillo. One way or another that savings will allow the Twins a 2008 budget 2MM higher than it would have been. Carl Pohlad, miser that he may be, most likely would have taken the money off the 2008 budget if Ryan had not basically cured the 2007 overage by dealing Castillo (and dumping Jeff Cirillo).
The acquisition of Martin provided the Twins with a CF prospect at the high A level behind CFers Denard Span (AAA) and Brandon Roberts (AA), neither of whom has yet shown the promise necessary to reasonably replace Hunter. It should be noted that a prospect on the fast track will generally need less than two years from High A to reach his first cup of major league coffee. Whether or not Martin can be that fast tracker is under debate, although he batted 290/361/426 in a pitcher's league (including 4 GCL ABs). These would be very good numbers for an age-appropriate CF in the Florida State League. As it is, the numbers are okay but nothing to get hopeful about.
Butera was an FSL all-star in 2007 before his promotion, yet again his High A numbers 258/348/418 look worse when one considers his age. The Twins needed a AA catcher, and Butera filled that role nicely. While he might someday make it to the bigs, Butera's ceiling is that of a defensive back-up. Martin is the player the Twins actually have some real hope for. He was drafted as a 22 yr old college senior, and his minor league experience has been one of success against younger competiton.
The cost of acquiring the two prospects was $0, outside of negligible minor league player salaries, and the Twins have at least two organization fillers and possibly helpful position players down the road.
Compare that to the alternative of having kept Castillo. Besides the almost $2MM it would have cost the Twins, they would also have had to sign the player drafted with the supplemental pick they would have received as compensation. The Twins will lose Torii Hunter and receive a pick from the team signing him and a supplemental pick between the 1st and 2nd rounds. Supplemental picks are ordered such that the teams drafting in the supp rd will draft in reverse order. The Twins finshish with the 14th worst record in the majors last year, and they have the 8th worst record among team losing Type A or B free agents. So losing Hunter might yield the 38th pick in the draft (along with a first or second round pick from the signing team).
The rule on supplemental draft pick order is one of reverse order, but a team may not draft their second supplement pick until all teams drafting in the supplement round have drafted in that round. There are twenty teams that will lose Type A or B free agents, but some will not select in the supp round due to not offering arbitration to their FA. Teams ahead of the Twins in the round might also have just that one pick. A conservative estimate is that the Twins will select 37th (for Hunter) and maybe 50th for Castillo. The 50th player received a bonus of $620,000 in 2007. So the trade of Castillo saved the Twins approximately $2.5 million and gave them one decent prospect and one organizational filler. Not bad.
One thought looms, however. That 50th player is likely pretty good, and you might liken it to previous 50th (or so) picks. The Royals selected Jeff Bianchi there in 2005 and thought they had a steal. The jury's out still. Outstanding prospects Reid Brignac, Yovani Gallardo, B.J Szymanski, and Brian Bixler were taken between 45-52 in 2004, while top Twins prospect Anthony Swarzak went at 61.
A better indicator might be whom the Twins chose in the 2nd round from 2001-2005, when their picks were somewhat close to #50. A quick look back shows the Twins taking Scott Tyler at #45 in 2001. Tyler, ironically, was traded to the Marlins for Castillo after the 2005 season. Jesse Crain (2002, 61), Scott Baker (2003, 58), Swarzak (2004, 61), and the nice prospect Paul Kelly (2005, 54) show that, at least with the Twins drafting, the 50th pick is a very good player or prospect.
The draft changed in 2006 as the supplemental round grew and the Twins had no supplemental picks. Joe Benson was drafted at 64 that year. For 2007 the Twins drafted Ben Revere at 28 and Danny Rams at 92. Needless to say, these recent draftees need to show more for us to determine their value.
I think what this analysis boils down to is that the Twins saved $2.5 million and received a decent prospect package by dealing Castillo, whereas they would have lost the money and drafted a very good prospect had they held onto him. Given the inherent risk associated with draft picks (although the Twins haven't yet missed), it appears Terry Ryan and the Twins took the safe route.
Somewhere that $2.5 million will come into play, and if you read Aaron Gleeman today, you will see that it might be used to pay newly acquired Craig Monroe (and read the comments to find out how Monroe might take a pay cut to this number).
Martin was a 23 yr old batting 287/358/421 for the Mets High A farm team, while Butera (who turned 24 days after the deal) after a recent promotion was batting 188/208/231 in 117 AA at-bats. Both players were old for High A in 2007, and neither was consider a top Mets prospect.
The alternative, of course, was to keep Castillo with the hope he could lead the Twins to the playoffs and garner the team both a first round and a supplemental pick as a Type A free agent. But the Twins correctly assessed that Castillo would not be enough to help the Twins reach the playoffs, and they further determined that the loss of Castillo would only yield the one supplemental pick that comes with being a Type B free agent.
So what was the trade worth to the Twins compared to what they would have received in compensation?
First of all, it should be noted that Terry Ryan saved nearly $2 MM by dealing Castillo. One way or another that savings will allow the Twins a 2008 budget 2MM higher than it would have been. Carl Pohlad, miser that he may be, most likely would have taken the money off the 2008 budget if Ryan had not basically cured the 2007 overage by dealing Castillo (and dumping Jeff Cirillo).
The acquisition of Martin provided the Twins with a CF prospect at the high A level behind CFers Denard Span (AAA) and Brandon Roberts (AA), neither of whom has yet shown the promise necessary to reasonably replace Hunter. It should be noted that a prospect on the fast track will generally need less than two years from High A to reach his first cup of major league coffee. Whether or not Martin can be that fast tracker is under debate, although he batted 290/361/426 in a pitcher's league (including 4 GCL ABs). These would be very good numbers for an age-appropriate CF in the Florida State League. As it is, the numbers are okay but nothing to get hopeful about.
Butera was an FSL all-star in 2007 before his promotion, yet again his High A numbers 258/348/418 look worse when one considers his age. The Twins needed a AA catcher, and Butera filled that role nicely. While he might someday make it to the bigs, Butera's ceiling is that of a defensive back-up. Martin is the player the Twins actually have some real hope for. He was drafted as a 22 yr old college senior, and his minor league experience has been one of success against younger competiton.
The cost of acquiring the two prospects was $0, outside of negligible minor league player salaries, and the Twins have at least two organization fillers and possibly helpful position players down the road.
Compare that to the alternative of having kept Castillo. Besides the almost $2MM it would have cost the Twins, they would also have had to sign the player drafted with the supplemental pick they would have received as compensation. The Twins will lose Torii Hunter and receive a pick from the team signing him and a supplemental pick between the 1st and 2nd rounds. Supplemental picks are ordered such that the teams drafting in the supp rd will draft in reverse order. The Twins finshish with the 14th worst record in the majors last year, and they have the 8th worst record among team losing Type A or B free agents. So losing Hunter might yield the 38th pick in the draft (along with a first or second round pick from the signing team).
The rule on supplemental draft pick order is one of reverse order, but a team may not draft their second supplement pick until all teams drafting in the supplement round have drafted in that round. There are twenty teams that will lose Type A or B free agents, but some will not select in the supp round due to not offering arbitration to their FA. Teams ahead of the Twins in the round might also have just that one pick. A conservative estimate is that the Twins will select 37th (for Hunter) and maybe 50th for Castillo. The 50th player received a bonus of $620,000 in 2007. So the trade of Castillo saved the Twins approximately $2.5 million and gave them one decent prospect and one organizational filler. Not bad.
One thought looms, however. That 50th player is likely pretty good, and you might liken it to previous 50th (or so) picks. The Royals selected Jeff Bianchi there in 2005 and thought they had a steal. The jury's out still. Outstanding prospects Reid Brignac, Yovani Gallardo, B.J Szymanski, and Brian Bixler were taken between 45-52 in 2004, while top Twins prospect Anthony Swarzak went at 61.
A better indicator might be whom the Twins chose in the 2nd round from 2001-2005, when their picks were somewhat close to #50. A quick look back shows the Twins taking Scott Tyler at #45 in 2001. Tyler, ironically, was traded to the Marlins for Castillo after the 2005 season. Jesse Crain (2002, 61), Scott Baker (2003, 58), Swarzak (2004, 61), and the nice prospect Paul Kelly (2005, 54) show that, at least with the Twins drafting, the 50th pick is a very good player or prospect.
The draft changed in 2006 as the supplemental round grew and the Twins had no supplemental picks. Joe Benson was drafted at 64 that year. For 2007 the Twins drafted Ben Revere at 28 and Danny Rams at 92. Needless to say, these recent draftees need to show more for us to determine their value.
I think what this analysis boils down to is that the Twins saved $2.5 million and received a decent prospect package by dealing Castillo, whereas they would have lost the money and drafted a very good prospect had they held onto him. Given the inherent risk associated with draft picks (although the Twins haven't yet missed), it appears Terry Ryan and the Twins took the safe route.
Somewhere that $2.5 million will come into play, and if you read Aaron Gleeman today, you will see that it might be used to pay newly acquired Craig Monroe (and read the comments to find out how Monroe might take a pay cut to this number).
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